Numerous behavioral factors have been identified as having an impact on household stockholding decisions. Given there is both theoretical and empirical evidence to support the premise that offspring gender can influence specific types of parental preferences, I model and test the theory that offspring gender has an effect on parental investment decision making. I find that having only female offspring increases the probability of stock market participation. Specifically, I find that for male respondents, having only female offspring increases the probability of stockholding by over 6%. In contrast, the relationship between stockholding and offspring gender was not significant for female respondents. (JEL: G11, D14)
Introduction
There are two kinds of fathers in traditional households: the fathers of sons and the fathers of daughters..... Letty Cottin Pogrebin (20th Century Writer) For several decades, finance scholars have been investigating the determinants of investment decisions and attempting to reconcile observed investment behavior with theoretical asset pricing models. The determinants of stock market participation has been one of the key questions of interest. For example, with regard to stockholding behavior, individual stock market participation is much lower than would be predicted by the consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) and other models, given the risk-adjusted expected returns from holding stock. Historically, portfolio choices of stock have been vital to economic advancement and wealth building, particularly during prosperous economic times. However, very little of the cross-sectional variation in portfolio behavior has been explained in the empirical finance literature on portfolio choice. Household characteristics that influence portfolio choice could lead to distributional welfare issues that are important to understand. Thus, the issue of household stock market participation has been intensely studied.
Several determinants of household stock market participation have been well established. Stock market participation is strongly increasing in wealth, increasing in household education, sensitive to transaction costs (Bogan (2008) ; Bertaut and Haliassos (1997) ; Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) ), and influenced by neighbor and peer effects (Brown, Ivković, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008) ; Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) ). Simulations of a calibrated life-cycle model, described in detail in Bertaut and Haliassos (1997) , show that participation costs are affected by level of education, the degree of risk aversion, labor income risk, and a bequest motive. Behavioral factors also have been empirically identified as having an impact on stockholding decisions. Malmendier and Nagel (2007) found behavioral effects on stockholding and bondholding decisions due to birth timing with respect to macroeconomic shocks. Could children also have an effect on household investment decisions? Given investment decisions affect family wealth levels which in turn have an effect on offspring educational attainment, intergenerational wealth transfers, and socio-economic status, the relationship between household investment decisions and children is an open and important question. Brown et al. (2008) and Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) have demonstrated that non-financial professionals can significantly influence the investment behavior of households. Barber and Odean (2001) provide evidence that marriage affects investment decisions. I hypothesize that offspring have an effect on household portfolio choices. There is an expanding body of literature that documents evidence of (decision maker) gender linked biases that influence investment behavior (Croson and Gneezy (2009) ; Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) ; Barber and Odean (2001) ). Specifically, I analyze the effect of offspring gender on household portfolio choice decisions.
There is both theoretical and empirical evidence to support the premise that offspring gender influences specific types of parental preferences. When these types of preferences (biases) affect investment decisions, there is a clear link between offspring gender and financial decisions. For instance, having daughters could influence parents' to shoulder more risk to gain a higher return investments due to the need to fund a dowry or cover perceived higher expenses associated with having girls. Having sons could induce a preference for a particular type of portfolio if parents want to earmark more/less funds for offspring educational expenses. Since offspring gender preferences have been shown to influence bequests (See Davies and Zhang (1995) ), this is another possible avenue through which child gender and financial decisions could be linked.
In this paper, I attempt to add to this area of research by considering the possibility that children can influence parental portfolio allocation. To the best of my knowledge offspring gender characteristics have not been previously associated with parental stockholding or bondholding.
I model and test the hypothesis that stockholding and bondholding decisions are influenced by offspring gender. Specifically, I test the hypothesis that having all female offspring increases parental stockholding. I find that having only female children increases the probability of holding stock (risky assets). This paper is designed to shed light on the issues related to offspring gender and investment decision making. Primarily, this paper aims to illuminate the modelling of household investment by empirically investigating the influence of family structure on investments in risky (and riskless) securities. As such, for most of this paper, I will focus on the empirical analysis. Although, I do discuss a theoretical basis and mechanism through which children specifically could shape their parents' investment behavior.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of related literature.
Section 3 discusses the theoretical basis and motivation for a parental preference that leads to different investment behavior for parents of daughters. Section 4 reviews the data and methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the econometric analysis and discusses the main results. Section 6 summarizes key findings and provides concluding remarks.
Literature Review
Most any person with a sibling of a different gender can attest to the fact that occasionally specific parental decisions seem to be influenced by the gender of the child affected by the decision. Downey, Jackson, and Powell (1994) document that generalized views on parenting are developed through maternal experiences in the family which are shaped by the sex composition of progeny. More rigorously, within the economics literature, offspring gender has been shown to affect many aspects of parental behavior: views on issues related to gender equity (Warner & Steel, 1999 , Warner, 1991 ; congressional voting (Washington, 2008) ; political party preferences (Oswald & Powdthavee, 2009);  divorce, fertility, and marriage (Dahl & Moretti, 2004) ; parental labor supply (Lundberg & Rose, 2002) ; investment in child education (Parish & Willis, 1993) . This paper connects with several strands of current finance and economics literature. Many elements of family structure have been linked to aspects of financial decision making behavior (See for example, Keister, 2003; Smith & Ward, 1980; Browning, 1992, and Hao, 1996) . The number of children a couple has, the average spacing between siblings and the timing of births within a marriage all have been purported to have important impacts on family savings. This relationship between family size and household savings has long been a popular theme in the demographic and development literature and the postulated negative correlation between them is thought to be a contributing factor in limiting capital formation and economic growth. Others have demonstrated that family size is not the relevant constraint and that any savings effects are related primarily to the age of children (Espenshade, 1975) . Smith and Ward (1980) found that young children depress savings for young families but increase savings for marriages of duration greater than five years.
The principal channel through which children act to reduce savings is the decline in female earnings associated with the child-induced withdrawal of wives from the labor force. For families in which the wife does not work, the estimates suggest that savings may actually increase with children.
Other closely related work involves investigations of U.S. data and has indicated that rapid child-bearing early in marriage inhibits asset growth and that these effects persist over a couple's lifetime (Freedman & Coombs, 1966; Coombs & Freedman, 1970) . Chitegi and Stafford (1999) find that a young family's likelihood of owning transaction accounts and stocks is affected by whether parents held these financial assets. Keister (2003) explores the relationship between family size in childhood and adults' wealth accumulation patterns. She shows that siblings reduce the material and nonmaterial resources available for each child in a family and that this diminishment of resources reduces educational attainment and direct intergenerational financial transfers. Hao (1996) finds that family net wealth varies with family structure along three lines, marriageremarriage, marriage-cohabitation, and male-female single parenthood and that marriage is a wealth-enhancing institution. He also shows that wealth accumulation also depends on saving behavior, which is a function of income and consumption. Saving behavior, inheritance, and transfers are ultimately determined by the family background and the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the parents. Race, sex, age, education of the parents, and community conditions of the residence are measures of these factors. In addition, family composition, including the number and ages of children, may also affect saving and the accumulation of wealth. Love (2009) shows that a family shock with respect to marital status has an impact on household savings and portfolio choice.
Theoretical Basis
Conceptually, many explanations could be offered for why parents would have an offspring genderbased preference with regard to investment behavior. I present a form of mental accounting that could describe offspring gender influenced household investment behavior. Traditional models typically assume as broad a form of accounting as possible: utility is specified only over total wealth or over total consumption, and not over individual choices for the utility function. A substantial body of experimental work, however, suggests that when engaged in mental accounting, individuals exhibit narrow framing, that is, they often do appear to focus on narrowly defined aspects of utility (See Barberis and Huang (2001) ). As Barberis and Huang (2001) discuss, the absence of narrow framing from standard asset-pricing models could be due to doubts about its normative acceptability. However, these doubts may be unwarranted: narrow framing "can be defended on normative grounds because it may simply reflect a concern for non-consumption sources of utility." (Barberis & Huang, 2001) Several types of framing could generate an offspring gender based influence with respect to household investment decisions. I will focus on the features of reference-based utility to generate narrow framing (DellaVigna, 2009) . Using the Köszegi and Rabin (2006) model of referencedependent utility that incorporates expectations about a reference point, one knows that for losses which are expected relative to the reference point, r, model predictions are identical to those of a model based solely on consumption utility. For losses which are unexpected relative to the reference point, the utility function shares the qualitative properties of standard formulations of prospect theory (See Köszegi and Rabin (2006) ; Köszegi and Rabin (2007) ).
Consider parents managing the spending and investment activities of the household. If parents exhibit reference-based utility then with expected household losses (consumption), parental behavior would follow standard consumption utility theory and parents would be risk averse in gains and losses. With reference-based utility and unexpected losses (consumption), parental behavior would follow prospect theory and be risk seeking in losses and risk averse in gains. If offspring of a particular gender have a higher probability of unexpected consumption, then parents with that offspring type would be more risk seeking with regard to household financial decisions.
I assume, that due to social/behavioral influences, there is a higher probability of unexpected consumption (expenses) with female children than with male children. Two main types of intuitive explanations could be given to support the assumption of an increased probability of surprise consumption with female children: compensating behavior and societal norms. Even parents that care equally for daughters and sons may need to provide additional financial assistance for daughters due to recognizing continued labor market discrimination against women; the greater likelihood of a daughter being unemployed (voluntary or involuntary); the need for females to have an independent source of power within her own marriage (non-cooperative, intra-household bargaining); or a desire to compensate daughters for other societal inequities. Thus, parents of daughters could have higher unexpected expenses than parents of sons. Societal norms also could create a higher probability of paying for daughters' weddings or providing other types of financial assistance.
Given these assumed differing consumption patterns between male and female offspring, parents with male children would be risk averse in gains and losses similar to standard utility theory, while parents with female children would follow prospect theory and be risk seeking in losses and risk averse in gains. Therefore, reference-based preferences could induce offspring gender based investment decisions. Households with more unexpected expenses (more female children) would be more risk seeking with regard to household finances and more likely to invest in risky assets.
This mental accounting, which I call "parental accounting", is similar to the "portfolio accounting" of Barberis and Huang (2001) . It is a broader form of mental accounting than individual stock accounting but still represents narrow framing. The technical specification of this theoretical model is detailed in Appendix A.
Data

Overview
To empirically evaluate the question of whether offspring gender influences investment decisions, I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were first surveyed in 1979. These individuals were interviewed annually through 1994 and are currently interviewed on a biennial basis. Since their first interview, many of the respondents have made transitions from school to work, and from their parents' homes to being parents and homeowners. These data provide an opportunity to study a large sample that represents American men and women born in the 1950s and 1960s, and living in the United States in 1979. Although a primary focus of the NLSY79 survey is labor force behavior, the content of the survey is considerably broader. The survey contains questions on income and assets, earnings, occupation, marital status, fertility, family structure, child characteristics, computer use, and educational attainment. These types of data make the NLSY79 a good survey to use to address issues relating to portfolio allocation and family structure. I use data collected in the 1979, 1998, and 2004 surveys since those survey years contain the variables relevant to my analysis and allow for controls of lagged variables. A detailed description of all variables used can be found in Appendix B.
Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1, 2, and 3 provide 2004 summary statistics of the data used. 1 2 From Table 1, one can see that the average age of the respondent in our sample is 43. Approximately half of the sample is male, over 59% of the sample is white, and respondents have an average of 12 years of education.
1 The interviews record information about the sources and amounts of income received during the past calendar year by the respondent and his or her spouse or partner. Data on income sources of an opposite-sex partner are available beginning in 1990; if a respondent volunteers such information for a same-sex partner, that information also is recorded. Income sources identified include the respondents' and their spouses' or partners' wages and salaries, income from military service, profits from a farm or business, Social Security, pensions and annuities, and alimony/child support.
2 All dollar amounts are in real 2004 dollars. The average net income is $64,700 and the average net worth is $208,300. Each respondent has an average of approximately 2 children. Figure 1 shows the distribution of total number of children, total number of sons, and total number of daughters. Over 95% of the sample has four or fewer children. I analyze the full sample but I also will separately study two groups of respondents: men and women. I separate the sample in this way because empirical evidence suggests that the financial decisions of men differ from women. Women have different preferences, levels of risk aversion, and discount rates than men (See Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Browning, 2000; Barber & Odean, 2001; and Bradford, 2009 ). These considerations would suggest that men and women could prefer different portfolio strategies. In general, these various differences imply that any biases associated with offspring gender may have differing impacts on a household's portfolio depending on the household composition. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the male and female respondent subgroups. Overall, there do not seem to be any striking differences in the summary statistics between the two groups.
The NLSY79 does not indicate whether or not the respondent is the household head or the financial decision maker. Consequently, one could conjecture that if males were disproportionately the financial decision makers, the female subgroup could differ with respect to response rates for asset questions in a manner that could influence the results. Figure 2 compares non-response rates for the specific questions about stock and bondholding. Overall the percentage of respondents that answered "Don't Know" or refused to answer the questions is less than 1.75%. Additionally, from
Figure 2, one can see that similar percentages of male and female respondents answered "Don't Know" to the stock and bondholding questions -indicating no differing response rates between the male and female subgroups that could drive any of the results. Issues related to the financial decision maker will be further addressed in the empirical analysis, as I will control for married respondents. ‡ ‡ Difference in means tests indicate that for the respondent group with only male children and the respondent group with only female children, there are no statistically significant differences in means for net worth, net income, savings, home value, mutual fund value, or bond value. There is a statistically significant difference in mean values for the value of stock holdings for the respondent group with only male children and the respondent group with only female children. 
Figure 3 shows the percent of respondents displaying risk aversion. 3 Figure 3 shows that female respondents generally are more risk averse than male respondents. Additionally from Figure 3 , one can see that respondents with only male children are more risk averse. 4
3 I classify a respondent as risk averse if (s)he prefers a certain salary to a lottery between a 50% chance of doubling his/her salary and a 50% chance of getting his/her salary cut by . 4 There is a statistically significant difference in average percent of risk averse respondents for the male subgroup compared to the female subgroup. The difference in average percent of risk averse respondents with only male children compared to risk averse respondents with only female children was weakly significant.
Econometric Analysis and Results
Empirical Framework
This paper posits that offspring gender may affect household portfolio decisions. If this is the case, one should expect that households with only female children will hold different portfolios than households with only male children. The empirical analysis below tests this hypothesis. I utilize probit models to understand, at a micro level, the relationship between stock market participation (individual stocks and mutual funds), bond market participation (fixed income securities and U.S. savings bonds), and offspring gender, while controlling for other factors that are known to affect participation. The models used to understand the extensive margin of asset market participation are similar to those used by Bogan (2008) and Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) . The dependent variable is a binary variable for (stock or bond) market participation in 2004, and the independent variables include dummy variables for offspring gender, number of children dummy variables, and respondent characteristic control variables.
Probit Model Specification
To properly document the effect of offspring gender on household investment decisions it is necessary to establish clearly a link between offspring gender and stock market participation or bond market participation in the sample. I relate stockholding and bondholding decisions to offspring gender controlling for wealth, income, education, age, and a number of socio-economic characteristics. I use univariate probit models where the dependent variable is a binary variable for (stock, mutual fund, fixed income, or U.S. savings bond) market participation in 2004, and the independent variables include dummy variables for offspring gender, number of children dummy variables, child age control variables, and respondent characteristic control variables. Notably, I control for inertia in holding financial assets with a dummy variable indicating if the respondent held stocks or bonds in a previous year; the effects of information and transaction costs with a computer usage dummy (See Bogan, 2008) ; aspects of the respondents' occupation or training that could lead to increased market participation; 5 and marriage to control for the fact that we cannot identify the financial decision maker in married households. 6 A detailed description of all of the variables used and how they are constructed can be found in Appendix B. 7 8 The model specification is:
where X ik is the set of child characteristic variables and Z il is the set of respondent characteristic control variables. 9
Since the gender of one's biological offspring is exogenous, this model specification is advantageous in that causality can be established. 10 While, the gender of an individual's offspring could influence investment decisions, it strains credibility to think that investment decisions determine the gender of an individual's offspring. 11
Results
In the first column of Table 5 , one can see that in addition to the usual suspects affecting stockholding behavior (net worth, income, pension plan participation, computer usage, etc.), having only female children increases the probability of holding stock by 0.0440 with a p-value of 0.0870.
5 The education, income, and voluntary contribution pension variables also serve to control for aspects of a household head's occupation or training that could lead to increased stock market participation.
6 Marriage could create bargaining and confounding effects that influence the financial decision making process. 7 The probit models contain those variables previously shown to be significant in explaining the probability of holding stock in the U.S. (See, for example, Bogan (2008) , Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) , and Bertaut (1998)).
8 In additional robustness checks of the model, I also control for respondent region of residence with region dummy variables (Northeast, Midwest, South and West). Regional controls do not affect the results in any meaningful way.
9 Due to data limitations it is not possible to perform a true fixed effects analysis. The hold stock variable was only collected in 2004. In previous years, respondents were asked if they held either stocks OR bonds in one question.
10 While the gender of each offspring is exogenous, the gender composition of the family may not be completely exogenous due to fertility choice. Thus, I control for family size with dummy variables for one child, two children, three children and four or more children. Notably, households with all female children have the same average number of children as households with all male children.
11 Some controversial areas of evolutionary biology assert maternal effects on the sex of offspring (See Grant (2008) ). This notion is not widely accepted in the science literature. Nonetheless in the robustness checks section, I will perform an analysis to address this issue.
The having only male children variable is not significant at the 15% level but the point estimate of 0.0325 is positive. When an income risk aversion variable is added to the model specification, the significance of the only female children variable declines but the point estimate is relatively stable.
In contrast, having only female children does not significantly affect the probability of holding mutual funds, fixed income securities, or U.S. savings bonds. Table 5 also shows that having only male children does not significantly affect the probability of owning stocks, mutual funds, fixed income securities, or U.S. savings bonds.
Both theoretical and empirical finance literature tells us that male and female groups should be evaluated separately. When the sample is divided based upon gender of the respondents, one can see stronger results with respect to stockholding (Table 6 ). For male respondents, having only female children increases the probability of holding stock by 0.0850 with a p-value of 0.0210. 12 In the male respondent subsample, when the income risk aversion variable is added the female children only variable is still highly significant with a p-value of 0.0300 and the point estimate is stable.
As in the full sample, the only male children variable is not significant for the male respondent subsample. The only male children variable has a p-value of 0.3830 and 0.2930 for the versions with and without risk aversion respectively. For female respondents, the only female children variable and the only male children variable are not significant. The fact that the effect is more pronounced in males is consistent with findings for other types of biases/preferences that have been found to be more prominent in males (e.g., overconfidence, risk-taking) (See Croson & Gneezy, 2009) . Tables 5 and 6 show that having only female children increases the probability of investing in stocks (more risky assets). The having only female children stockholding effect is present in the full sample but is most pronounced in the male respondent subsample. While the main empirical analysis focuses on the extensive margin of asset holdings, I also do look at the effect of offspring gender on the intensive margin of stock market participation using a tobit model but find no significant effects. 13 12 As in Warner and Steel (1999) , the result is particularly strong for fathers. 13 Results available upon request.
Within my main model specification, I do control for potential non-linear effects of total number of children on asset holding behavior with dummy variables for the respondent's total number of children (one child dummy, two children dummy, three children dummy, and four children dummy).
However, the decision to have children is not exogenous. Hence, I analyze the effects of offspring gender on stockholding behavior utilizing a subsample of only respondents that have children.
In Table 7 , for male respondents with children, one can see that having only female children significantly increases the probability of holding stock by 0.0714 (p-value of 0.0440) for the version without a respondent risk aversion control and by 0.0671 (p-value of 0.0610) for the version with a respondent risk aversion control. Having only male children does not significantly affect the probability of holding stock. Moreover, for the female respondents with children subsample, the children gender variables are not significant. This provides more compelling evidence of parental accounting. 
Robustness Checks
Bivariate Probit Analysis
Some controversial areas of evolutionary biology assert that maternal testosterone levels influence the sex of offspring (See Grant (2008) ). If this is the case, then in theory, there could be some unobserved variable that influences both investment choices and offspring gender. For women, testosterone levels would influence both investment decisions and offspring gender. For males there would need to be an unobserved variable that causes men to be attracted to women with certain testosterone levels that also influences investment behavior. The notion of maternal effects on the sex of offspring is not widely accepted in the scientific community. Nonetheless, I will perform a bivariate probit analysis to address this remote possibility.
With the assumptions that the error terms i are jointly normally distributed, a bivariate probit analysis can control for unobserved heterogeneity resulting from respondent-specific factors with correlation γ between the disturbances for each respondent i. The bivariate probit model is set-up such that Y 1 is a binary variable for stock market participation and Y 2 is a binary variable for offspring gender category (only female children, only male children or male and female children).
The independent variables are wealth, income, education, age, and other respondent characteristics. The model generates coefficients that are used to calculate average joint and conditional probabilities (See Table 8 ). From these conditional probabilities, one can see that the likelihood of stock ownership is greatest if the respondent has only female children. This is consistent with the previous results demonstrating that having only female children causes increased stock market participation. Table 9 shows that there is no significant effect of offspring gender on stockholding for respondents with children all between the ages of 6 and 13 or for respondents with children all between 14 and 17. However, for respondents with children all between 18 and 21, having all female children has a positive and significant effect on stockholding.
Having all female children all between the ages of 18 and 21 increases the probability of a household holding stock by 0.1645 with a p-value of 0.0430.
Older female children, that soon will be leaving the parental household, have a significant effect on parental portfolio choice. This effect is even larger in the male respondent subgroup in which having only female children, all between the ages of 18 and 21 increases the probability of stock holding by 0.1889 with a p-value of 0.0470. Given that older individuals (those with older children) should be divesting from stocks and transitioning to less risky assets in preparation for retirement, this additional evidence provides more support for the theoretical model in which reference-based preferences drive portfolio choice decisions. The unexpected expenses discussed in Section 3 would generally occur more with older female children than with younger female children. Thus, one would expect to observe parents with older female children to demonstrate more risk seeking investment behavior by investing in risky assets with a higher probability. The results in Table 9 are consistent with this assertion. 
Concluding Remarks
Recent advances in behavioral finance have demonstrated that investors do not always behave rationally but often deviate from rationality in very systematic ways; overconfidence, excessive optimism, loss aversion. This paper demonstrates the existence of a behavioral effect which is related to gender roles that could help to shed more light on questions of stock market participation.
The empirical results and theoretical model provide support for a behavioral finance model which incorporates gender biases associated with offspring. Empirically, these biases are most evident with respect to stockholding and are more pronounced in male respondents. Unlike previous literature that indicates having a wife makes men less likely to hold stock, having only female children increases the probability of men holding stock. For male respondents, having only female children greatly increases the probability of holding stock with marginal effects ranging from 0.0671 to 0.0850. In contrast, the only female children variable is not significant for female respondents.
Thus, within the domain of gender based behavioral effects that influence investment behavior, there is evidence that we also should include offspring gender effects.
While I do discuss a theoretical basis for the effect that I document, it is difficult empirically to tease out all of the different preferences and test among competing explanations. Although, based upon the results, one can rule out explanations associated with female children increasing risk aversion. My results are most consistent with a mental accounting or a referenced-based preference story.
There is increasing evidence that family structure characteristics like marital status and children may be comparably important for the understanding of portfolio choices (Love, 2009) . Historically, portfolio choices of stock have been key to long-term wealth building, particularly during strong economic times. Given family wealth levels have an effect on intergenerational wealth transfers, offspring educational attainment, and offspring socio-economic status, this parental accounting (specifically this "father-daughter stockholding effect") could have important implications for dis-tributional welfare issues. Consequently, understanding any behavioral issues associated with offspring and investment decisions is critical.
The parents maximize expected utility and their maximization problem is:
A.2 The Analysis
To solve analytically, I specify functional forms for both the consumption/bequest utility and the gain-loss utility. For the consumption/bequest utility, I consider an additively separable constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form for the utility function in which α = 1 (log utility). For the gain-loss utility, consistent with Köszegi and Rabin (2006) , I assume that µ(·) satisfies the salient properties. Specifically, similar to Köszegi and Rabin (2006) , I assume that
where δ > 0 is the weight the parents attach to gain-loss utility and η > 1 is the "coefficient of loss aversion".
To streamline notation, I will let β ≡ ηδ.
The first order conditions for this specific functional form are:
Combining Equations 3 and 4 yields the following expression for S:
where
Equation 5 implies
Thus, stockholding will be increasing in the proportion of daughters if the following sufficient conditions hold:
(
More generally these sufficient conditions would be
Hence, we would have the following general result:
Result -For household that exhibit reference-based utility, if there is a higher probability of unexpected consumption with a particular gender offspring, stockholding will be increasing in the proportion of offspring of that gender.
Reference-based utility combined with the assumption of a particular offspring gender having a higher probability of unexpected consumption drives the result. Intuitively, these results imply that parents' mental accounting can influence portfolio decisions. Parents with referenced-based preferences that have more female children (i.e. more unexpected consumption) will be more risk seeking with financial decisions and thus have a greater probability of investing in risky assets. 14 This theoretical result leads to specific testable implications that I evaluate empirically.
14 Theoretically, this is not necessarily the case with regard to riskless assets. For household that exhibit referencebased utility, if there is a higher probability of unexpected consumption with a particular gender offspring, bond holding is not necessarily increasing in the proportion of offspring of that gender (i.e., 
B Description of Variables Used in Empirical Analysis
Asset, Income and Wealth Variables
• Own Stock Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent (or spouse) owns stock in 2004 and is set to 0 otherwise. Stock ownership includes owning shares of stock in publicly held corporations or investment trusts. It does not include assets in IRA accounts, Koegh accounts, 401Ks or similar defined contribution pension plans.
• Own Bonds Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent (or spouse) owns U.S. savings bonds in 2004 and is set to 0 otherwise.
• Own Other Fixed Income Securities Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent (or spouse) owns any corporate bonds or any government securities such as U.S. Treasury Bills, U.S. Treasury Bonds, or state or municipal bonds. savings bonds in 2004 and is set to 0 otherwise.
• Owned Stocks and Bonds Previously Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent (or spouse) owned stocks or bonds in 1998 and is set to 0 otherwise. Stock ownership includes owning shares of stock in publicly held corporations or investment trusts. It does not include assets in IRA accounts, Koegh accounts, 401Ks or similar defined contribution pension plans.
• Log of Net Income -The natural logarithm of the respondent (and spouse) net income. Net income includes salary, wages, investment income, and other income. • Own Home Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent owns a home in 2004 and is set to 0 otherwise.
Respondent Characteristic Variables
• Age of Respondent -The age of the respondent.
• Years of Education -The years of education of the respondent.
• Male Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent is male in a given year and is set to 0 otherwise.
• African American Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent is African American and is set to 0 otherwise.
• Married Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent is married in a given year and is set to 0 otherwise.
• Managerial and Professional Occupation Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent has an occupation that has a 1980 census code of managerial/professional specialties. The variable is set to 0 otherwise.
• Voluntary Contribution Pension Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent has a voluntary contribution pension and is set to 0 otherwise.
• Computer User Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 0 if the head of the household indicated that he/she did not work with computers. The variable is set to 1 otherwise.
• Not Risk Averse Dummy Variable -A dummy variable indicating if the respondent indicates risk aversion. The variable is given a value of 0 if the household head would prefer a certain salary to a lottery between a 50% chance of doubling their salary and a 50% chance of getting their salary cut by 1 3 . The variable is set to 1 otherwise.
Child Characteristic Variables
• Only Female Children Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent has only female children and is set to 0 otherwise.
• Only Male Children Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent has only male children and is set to 0 otherwise.
• Male and Female Children Dummy Variable -A dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the respondent has both male and female children and is set to 0 otherwise.
• Number of Children Dummy Variables -Dummy variables for the respondent's number of children (One Child Dummy, Two Children Dummy, Three Children Dummy, Four Children Dummy). Dummy variables for only one, two, three, and four children are used since over 95% of the sample has four or fewer children.
• Percent of Children Between Ages 0 and 5 (inclusive) -The percent of the respondent's children that are between the ages of zero and five.
• Percent of Children Between Ages 6 and 13 (inclusive) -The percent of the respondent's children that are between the ages of six and thirteen.
• Percent of Children Between Ages 14 and 17 (inclusive) -The percent of the respondent's children that are between the ages of fourteen and seventeen.
• Percent of Children Between Ages 18 and 22 (inclusive) -The percent of the respondent's children that are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two.
• Percent of Children Over Age 22 -The percent of the respondent's children that are over age twenty-two.
